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I. INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever had that strange sensation that you are being 
watched? You casually glance around to see if anyone is staring at 
you. You do not see anything unusual, but you cannot shake the 
feeling. You can feel someone’s eyes on you as the goosebumps 
begin to spread, but you just cannot locate the source. Is it simply 
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paranoia on your part or is this a side effect of living in a time 
where there are cameras everywhere you look? Cameras are on 
streetlights at intersections, in nearly every store and many homes, 
and on every police squad car. Cameras are also in the pockets of 
almost every single person that you see. What is the one place that 
has not been taken over by prying eyes? Not too long ago, one 
might have said the sky; however, it is likely that is no longer the 
case. 
The drones that have been used so frequently in foreign wars 
are beginning to turn their gazes upon the United States. Drones 
are an exciting new tool for police officers and a terrifying new 
threat in the eyes of civil libertarians. Police drones have the 
potential to save thousands of lives—they also have the potential to 
keep an entire nation under constant surveillance and 
systematically remove any semblance of privacy. 
A passage from George Orwell’s nightmarish vision of life in a 
surveillance-state society, written long before drone technology 
surfaced, eerily resembles the issue that this article attempts to 
discuss: 
The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every 
commanding corner. There was one on the house front 
immediately opposite. Big Brother Is Watching You, the 
caption said . . . In the far distance a helicopter skimmed 
down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a 
bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It 
was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.1 
How can society deal with such powerful new technology? This 
article seeks to answer that question by examining Supreme Court 
cases,2 the constitutionality of police drone use in Minnesota,3 and 
current legislation put forward by other states.4 This article 
 
 1.  Compare GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books 1961), with Matthew R. 
Koerner, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 1129, 1130 (2015) (“Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of 
governmental surveillance and Chairman of the 113th Congress’ Senate 
Intelligence Committee, recently found herself, rather ironically, as the target of 
surveillance. One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the window to 
check on a protest that was taking place outside. Much to her surprise, a small 
drone hovered on the other side of the window, only inches away, spying on her. 
The drone immediately flew away.”). 
 2.  See infra Part III. 
 3.  See infra Part IV.  
 4.  See infra Part V.  
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concludes by making a recommendation for an ideal statute 
controlling police drone use.5 The article begins by giving a general 
background of drones and drone technology.6 
II. BACKGROUND 
Drone technology, already quite complex, is advancing at a 
rapid pace, with which the Supreme Court, Congress, and state 
legislators are struggling to keep up. The term “drone” is used to 
describe an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), but machines differ 
immensely from model to model.7 Some are as small as a bug, while 
others are as big as commercial airliners.8 There are drones that 
can remain in the sky for days, and there are drones whose 
batteries last less than thirty minutes.9 The functionality and 
features of drones are limited only by one’s imagination.10 Drones 
can be equipped with high-powered cameras, facial recognition 
technology, microphones, programs that recognize suspicious 
behavior, and weapons both lethal and non-lethal.11 
There are those who regard this issue as a problem for future 
generations or something that is only prevalent in science fiction 
movies.12 These individuals would likely be quite surprised to learn 
 
 5.  See infra Part VI.  
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See Keric D. Clanahan, Drone-Sourcing? United States Air Force Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, Inherently Governmental Functions, and the Role of Contractors, 22 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 135, 138 n.10 (2012) (providing an overview of the different terms used to 
describe UAS or drones). 
 8.  RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN 
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2 (2013); see also Koerner, supra note 1, at 1150 (“Current 
models range in size from a wingspan of just three centimeters to over forty 
meters.”). 
 9.  THOMPSON II, supra note 8, at 15–16. 
 10.  See generally Joshua D. Beard, Up in the Air: The Legal Status of Drones, 94 
MICH. B.J. 20, 20–21 (2015) (noting areas in which drones possess potential use 
including advertisement, media coverage, package transportation, agriculture, 
photography, and mapping). 
 11.  See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: 
Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 
1165–78 (2013) (discussing current drone technologies and where they might 
expand going forward). 
 12.  Joshua Foust, The Science Fiction of Drone-Phobia, BEACON (Oct. 14, 2013, 
4:46 PM), https://www.beaconreader.com/joshua-foust/the-science-fiction-of        
-drone-phobia. 
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of the quickly developing arsenal of drones purchased and 
possessed by federal agencies across the nation. For example, the 
FBI has spent over three million dollars assembling a fleet of 
drones that has been used in operations since 2006.13 These 
operations have involved storming barricaded buildings, tracking 
criminal suspects, and examining crime scenes.14 Another agency 
heavily invested in the use of drone technology is the U.S. Border 
Patrol.15 The operating cost alone for the border patrol’s drones is 
approximately $12,255 per hour.16 Interestingly, police have also 
uncovered instances of drug smugglers using drones to transport 
drugs across the border from Mexico.17 
Federal agencies have not been selfish with their drones 
either. They have been more than happy to lend their drones to 
local police departments when they are needed.18 The Department 
of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection conducted 
687 drone missions for other agencies from 2010 to 2012.19 
Additionally, several police departments have sought to add drones 
to their own arsenals. Drones have been used for various domestic 
operations by police departments in North Dakota,20 Texas,21 and 
 
 13.  Brian Bennett, FBI Has Been Using Drones Since 2006, Watchdog Agency Says, 
L.A. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow 
/la-na-nn-fbi-using-drones-2006-20130926-story.html#axzz2xlB06oDp. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See Brian Bennett, Border Drones Are Ineffective, Badly Managed, Too 
Expensive, Official Says, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com 
/nation/immigration/la-na-border-drones-20150107-story.html. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Kristina Davis, Two Plead Guilty in Border Drug Smuggling by Drone, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015, 9:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me   
-drone-drugs-20150813-story.html. 
 18.  Sandra Fulton, Police Hunger for Drones May be Growing, but So Are Privacy 
Concerns, ACLU (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:06 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/police          
-hunger-drones-may-be-growing-so-are-privacy-concerns (“In 2010, for example, 
DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted 76 drone missions for 
other agencies. The next year, that number quadrupled, and it remained at nearly 
the same level in 2012.”). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American 
Citizen, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news 
/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american       
-citizen. 
 21.  See Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to 
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22 
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Wisconsin.22 In addition, a total of eighty-one police departments, 
universities,23 and various other state and federal departments have 
applied for drone operational licenses from the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).24 
The use of drones by law enforcement agencies is slowly 
increasing.25 However, a rapid surge in drone use has occurred in 
the private sphere.26 Small, privately owned drones are becoming 
more affordable and more visible in day-to-day life.27 The 
proliferation of drones has been so rapid that the FAA estimates 
that there will be approximately 30,000 drones in the air within ten 
years.28 In preparing for a future where drones will likely take up a 
sizable amount of the national airspace, the FAA recently released a 
set of guidelines that dictate the proper and improper ways to use 
personal drones, as well as a licensing system for those who wish to 
fly drones.29 Given the rising popularity of personal drone use, it is 
 
/AR2011012204111.html. 
 22.  See Anne Jungen, West Salem Police Start Using Drone; New Technology Made 
Debut in August, WASH. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com 
/news/2015/sep/21/west-salem-police-using-drone/?page=all. 
 23.  See Perry Chiaramonte, Growing Number of Universities Want to Fly Drones 
over Campus, Report Shows, FOX NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com 
/tech/2013/02/28/high-flying-drones-over-halls-higher-ed.html (“The Georgia 
Institute of Technology’s police department applied for a permit to use two small 
helicopter drones during special events, as well as day-to-day operations, to 
respond to areas before a police officer would quickly place eyes on the target or 
crisis area.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 24.  See Shawn Musgrave, Finally, Here’s Every Organization Allowed to Fly Drones 
in the US, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com 
/read/every-organization-flying-drones-in-the-us. 
 25.  See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need 
for State Legislation, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 424 (2015). 
 26.  See Welcome to the Drone Age, ECONOMIST (Sept. 26, 2015), http:// 
www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21666118-miniature-pilotless   
-aircraft-are-verge-becoming-commonplace-welcome. 
 27.  See id.  
 28.  Robert Johnson, FAA: Look for 30,000 Drones to Fill American Skies by the End 
of the Decade, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com 
/robert-johnson-bi-30000-drones-by-2020-2012-2. 
 29.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FAA ORDER NO. 8000.372A, UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVES (DAR) FOR 
UAS CERTIFICATION AT UAS TEST (2014); see also Brian Stern & Matthias Rubekeil, 
Coming Home to Roost—Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 62 R.I. BUS. J. 5, 9 
(2013) (“The deadline for this plan as mandated by Congress is September 2015 
and likely to create a lot of movement in the market for drone use by private 
companies, perhaps resulting in changes to society and business similar to those of 
5
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very likely that the application of these guidelines will have an 
impact on how society views drone use by the police.30 
The drones that law enforcement agencies have access to today 
are fairly basic in their functionality.31 For example, the Los 
Angeles Police Department possesses two Draganflyer X6 drones.32 
These drones are capable of providing high definition live video of 
whatever its cameras capture; however, they are only able to fly for 
twenty to twenty-five minutes before the battery must be changed.33 
This technology limits the privacy concerns of drones, but better 
technology is not far off.34 
The U.S. military has developed drone technology that, if used 
in domestic law enforcement operations, could pose massive 
constitutional privacy concerns. The most extreme example of this 
type of technology is called the “Gorgon Stare.”35 The Gorgon Stare 
is a large drone equipped with a wide-angle lens capable of 
recording visual information.36 In practice, this means that this 
drone can hover high in the sky and, using its wide-angle lens, 
record the visual information of an entire city in real-time.37 If 
 
the mass proliferation of affordable cellular tele-phony in the early 21st century.”). 
 30.  Tyler Hite, Domestic Presence in the Skies: Why Americans Should Care About 
Private Drone Regulation, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 184, 213–15 (2015). 
 31.  See, e.g., Questions Many People Ask of Us, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS INC. 
[hereinafter DRAGANFLY], http://www.draganfly.com/questions-answers (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2016) (discussing functions of a particular drone, such as its ability 
to provide real-time camera viewing, a height limit of 400 to 500 feet, and the basic 
components damaged during a crash). 
 32.  See Melissa Pamer & Mark Mester, LAPD’s 2 Drones Will Remain Grounded 
During Policy Review, Police Commission Says Amid Protests, KTLA 5 NEWS (Sep. 15, 
2014, 8:28 AM), http://ktla.com/2014/09/15/anti-spying-group-drone-free-lapd   
-to-protest-state-bill-that-would-allow-police-drones; Jim Newton, Drones and the 
LAPD, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe  
-newton-column-lapd-drones-20141117-column.html. 
 33.  See, e.g., DRAGANFLY, supra note 31. 
 34.  See Marra & McNeil, supra note 11, at 1174 (“Tomorrow’s drones will 
exhibit greater autonomy along all four stages of the OODA Loop [Observe, 
Orient, Decide, Act]. They will require less human interaction, navigate greater 
levels of environmental uncertainty, and enjoy higher levels of mission 
assertiveness.”).  
 35.  See Ellen Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, With Air Force’s Gorgon Drone ‘We 
Can See Everything’, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:09 AM), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/01 
/AR2011010102690 _pf.html.  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
6
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anything were to happen in that particular city, it would be 
recorded and could be viewed later by military personnel who 
might even be able to see who committed the act in question.38 
Currently the Gorgon Stare technology is fully within the 
purview of the military, however the application of this technology 
to domestic police use could be very useful to law enforcement 
agencies. For example, say the Boston Police Department obtained 
a drone with Gorgon Stare technology. The drone could observe 
the entire city, and when the bombs went off at the Boston 
Marathon in 2013, the recorded images could have been analyzed 
to see who the bombers were and where they went after the 
bombing. This technology could have located the bombers in a 
very short amount of time. However, the drone would also record 
the movements of every citizen of Boston, drastically impacting 
their privacy rights. 
With the scope of future drone technology in mind, it is easy 
to see why citizens are wary of law enforcement agencies possessing 
drones, even if they are a far cry from the Gorgon Stare 
technology.39Citizens have voiced their concern over the police use 
of drones through protests.40 
In August 2015, North Dakota passed House Bill 1328, which 
made it legal for police to equip drones with non-lethal weapons.41 
This recent development in drone legislation has been met with 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Fulton, supra note 18; Nadia Prupis, Activists Sound Alarm as More Police 
Departments Consider Using Drones, MINT PRESS NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014), http:// 
www.mintpressnews.com/activists-sound-alarm-police-departments-consider-using  
-drones/195916; Christian M. Wade, Battle Brewing over Police Drones in Mass., 
NEWBURY PORT NEWS (Mar. 28, 2015, 3:20 AM), http://www.newburyportnews.com 
/news/local_news/battle-brewing-over-police-drones-in-mass/article_5846a6a5      
-31b7-5636-abc6-c52344e0de90.html. 
 40.  See Joseph Serna, Anti-Spying Coalition Launches Campaign Against LAPD 
Drones, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local 
/lanow/la-me-ln-anti-drone-campaign-lapd-city-hall-20140821-story.html; Gordon 
Tokumatsu & Jeanne Kuang, City Hall Protesters Demand “Drone-Free LAPD”, NBC 
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/City-Hall     
-Protesters-Demand-Drone-Free-LAPD-272202761.html (describing the concern 
that certain segments of society have when it comes to trusting police officers and 
the discretion that they possess in enforcing the law). 
 41.  See Eyragon Eidam, Reports on North Dakota Weaponized Drone Law Miss 
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extreme distrust and disappointment.42 Even police departments in 
North Dakota are skeptical about the power that they have been 
granted. A Lieutenant of the Fargo Police Department, Michael 
Mitchell, said that he is “perplexed, because we do not see many 
reasons why we would use such technology.”43 
Regardless of how one views drones, the facts show drone use 
is on the rise. Every year society will see more and more drones, 
and every year society will encounter new problems, as well as new 
uses for drones. The question that needs to be asked: How can 
society balance the positive, useful aspects of drones with the 
negative, privacy issues of drones? Is this something that the 
Constitution and its interpretive case law are prepared to handle? Is 
it necessary to enact federal or state legislation in order to manage 
this new technology? Finally, what kind of legislation is the most 
appropriate to strike the perfect balance between privacy concerns 
and police utility? 
III. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND DOMESTIC DRONE USE 
Domestic drone use by law enforcement agencies is a relatively 
new phenomenon. There is no case law expressly ruling on the 
constitutionality of law enforcement’s use of drones. At the same 
time, law enforcement agencies have been pushing the limits of the 
Fourth Amendment for centuries.44 Thus, there is existing case law 
 
 42.  See Jennifer Cook, Letter: Weaponized ND Drones Terrible Idea, IN FORUM 
(Sep. 20, 2015, 12:34 AM), http://www.inforum.com/letters/3842432-letter           
-weaponized-nd-drones-terrible-idea; Mark Karlin, Look Out: Drones That Shoot 
Tasers Now Legal for Police Use in First State, BUZZFLASH (Sep. 11, 2015, 5:17 AM), 
http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/drones-that-shoot-tasers-now     
-legal-for-police-use-in-north-dakota/19524-drones-that-shoot-tasers-now-legal-for    
-police-use-in-north-dakota. 
 43.  Noel Brinkerhoff, Fargo Police Dept. Shuns Weaponized Drones Approved for 
Police by North Dakota, ALLGOV (Sep. 5, 2015), http://www.allgov.com/news 
/controversies/fargo-police-dept-shuns-weaponized-drones-approved-for-police-by 
-north-dakota-150905?news=857351. But see Matt Alderton, To the Rescue! Why 
Drones in Police Work are the Future of Crime Fighting, LINE/SHAPE/SPACE (April 30, 
2015, 5:44 PM), http://lineshapespace.com/drones-in-police-work-future-crime     
-fighting (“It’s like having 20 officers on patrol or more . . . .”). 
 44.  See generally Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the 
Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1992); Thomas Y. 
Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of 
Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933 
(2010); William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a 
8
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that can be tentatively applied to scenarios involving domestic 
drone use for surveillance purposes.45 The Constitution itself is the 
ideal starting place for this analysis. 
A. The Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated . . . .”46 This clause has guided police conduct and been 
the subject of significant case law.47 This case law has been used to 
interpret what constitutes a search and what constitutes an 
unreasonable search and seizure.48 As of the writing of this article, 
the Supreme Court has not heard, nor is scheduled to hear, any 
cases involving police use of a drone in a way that allegedly violated 
the Fourth Amendment. The particular features that drones can 
offer make them potentially excellent surveillance tools, and it is 
likely only a matter of time before the Supreme Court is called 
upon to weigh in on the issue.49 
 
Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799 (2000); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the 
Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 45.  See Jennifer O’Brien, Warrantless Government Drone Surveillance: A Challenge 
to the Fourth Amendment, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 155, 181–88 
(2013). 
 46.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 47.  See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (“It is our 
opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man’s private papers to 
establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the 
scope of the fourth amendment to the constitution, in all cases in which a search 
and seizure would be, because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole 
object and purpose of search and seizure.”). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.1(a) (5th ed. 2015) (providing a history of the origins of the 
Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002). 
 48.  Koerner, supra note 1, at 1130 (“The Fourth Amendment is the ‘chief 
source of privacy protection’ in the American justice system. It is intended to 
empower the government to investigate and enforce laws to a ‘reasonably 
satisfactory level,’ while still restricting these powers.” (quoting RONALD J. ALLEN, 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 337 (2011))). 
 49.  See Michael J. Sheehan, Note, U.S. Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Rights & 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: An Appeal for Bright-Line Legislative Action, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. 
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 255, 279 (2013) (“Many types of UAVs, especially those 
employing helicopter-style rotors with hover and stare capabilities will provide a 
major challenge to the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the aerial 
9
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B. Developing Fourth Amendment Case Law 
The bedrock case in the development of Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure jurisprudence is Katz v. United States.50 There, 
Justice Harlan—in his frequently cited concurrence—laid out the 
standard on how to analyze whether a search was reasonable within 
the eyes of the Constitution.51 This analysis requires the fact finder 
to determine whether the individual subjected to the alleged 
search had a subjective expectation of privacy and whether society 
is objectively prepared to deem that privacy expectation 
reasonable.52 Based on this analysis, Justice Harlan stated that “a 
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 
‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited.”53 
The Katz test eventually became known as the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test and has been applied in virtually every 
Fourth Amendment aerial search case since.54 Two lines of 
authority applying this test are particularly relevant to the 
constitutionality of police drone use: police tracking of individuals 
and police aerial surveillance. 
1. Police Tracking of Individuals 
In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court reviewed police 
use of advanced technology geared toward tracking the location of 
a suspect.55 Without obtaining a warrant, Minnesota police officers 
placed a beeper equipped with a radio transmitter into a barrel of 
chloroform that was later sold to the suspect.56 Police then used 
 
surveillance cases, Ciraolo and Riley, because these UAVs are often designed for 
flight below the operating levels of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 50.  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Koerner, supra 
note 1, at 1143–45 (“The Court first announced the privacy-rights paradigm in 
Katz v. United States.”).  
 51.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Koerner, supra note 1, at 1144–45 (describing the use of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test over the decades since Katz and the 
application of the test to new areas of search and seizure jurisprudence). 
 55.  460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
 56.  Id. at 277–78. 
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that beeper to locate a cabin owned by the suspect.57 Following 
three days of visual surveillance, the police obtained a search 
warrant and discovered a drug laboratory inside the cabin.58 
The Supreme Court found that the use of the beeper was not a 
search because “a person traveling . . . on public thoroughfares has 
no [objective] reasonable expectation of privacy.”59 Thus, 
[w]hen Petschen traveled over the public streets he 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the 
fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, 
and the fact of his final destination when he exited from 
public roads onto private property.60 
The majority believed that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the police from “augmenting” their senses with the use of 
“science and technology.”61 The defendant’s constitutional claim 
rested on the idea that the use of beepers in such a way could lead 
to tracking a citizen’s location twenty-four hours a day for seven 
days a week, without any judicial oversight.62 The majority declined 
to confront this issue and focused solely on the fact pattern that was 
presented in the record.63 Further, the majority rejected the idea 
that the technology used was a search because it was making police 
tracking more efficient.64 The Court focused on the idea that this 
would not have constituted a search if the defendant had simply 
been tailed by a police officer instead of tracked via radio 
transmitter.65 
Knotts seemed to give police the green light on using advanced 
technology in order to further investigative efficiency. This 
naturally led to cases where police use of technology went too far. 
United States v. Karo presented the Court with a nearly identical 
fact pattern to that in Knotts.66 However, Karo contained one crucial 
difference: the DEA continued to monitor the beeper after it had 
 
 57.  Id. at 278. 
 58.  Id. at 279. 
 59.  Id. at 281. 
 60.  Id. at 281–82. 
 61.  Id. at 282. 
 62.  Id. at 283. 
 63.  Id. at 284. 
 64.  Id. (“We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, 
and we decline to do so now.”). 
 65.  Id. at 285. 
 66.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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entered the subject house.67 In doing so, the DEA found that the 
illegal material was being transported from house to house.68 The 
Court found this constituted an illegal search because the beeper 
was transmitting information from inside the homes in which it was 
stored.69 This told agents that at a particular time, in a particular 
place, and inside a particular home, there were illegal materials.70 
The Court also found if the technology had not been used and the 
police officer personally wanted to confirm that there were illegal 
materials inside the house, the officer would have had to walk into 
the house and look around for the illegal materials.71 This behavior 
would obviously constitute a search and, therefore, for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment, the use of the beeper was found to be an 
unconstitutional, warrantless search.72 
In a 2012 case, United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court 
heard another Fourth Amendment search case involving the police 
tracking of an individual’s whereabouts.73 Justice Alito and Justice 
Sotomayor each wrote a concurrence and discussed the difficulties 
that could arise in future constitutional privacy cases.74 
Jones involved a GPS tracker that officers secretly planted on 
the underside of Jones’ truck.75 The government then tracked the 
GPS for the next twenty-eight days and collected over 2000 pages of 
data.76 Jones argued that this was a violation of his reasonable 
expectation of privacy.77 
The Court held that the warrantless police actions violated the 
Fourth Amendment.78 Curiously, the majority decided it was 
unnecessary to apply the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, 
based on its belief that the use of the GPS clearly violated the 
common law trespass theory, citing a case from 1765.79 By 2012, 
 
 67.  Id. at 708–10. 
 68.  Id. at 708–09. 
 69.  Id. at 715.  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 74.  See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 75.  Id. at 948 (Scalia, J., majority). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 950.  
 78.  Id. at 954.  
 79.  Id. at 949 (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.)); 
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many scholars believed the trespass theory in constitutional search 
and seizure analysis disappeared and was completely supplanted by 
the Katz test.80 The majority added an element to the test used for 
determining whether a search has occurred: if the government 
physically trespasses on a citizen’s private property, then there is 
automatically a search, but if the government does not physically 
trespass, then the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis 
follows.81 
The majority’s clarification of the test used to determine 
whether a search has occurred has proven useful in subsequent 
cases.82 However, the real takeaway from this case is in the 
concurring opinions of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito. 
Justice Sotomayor laid out two major concerns with the use of 
GPS technology: (1) the wealth and breadth of information that 
can be collected; and (2) its relatively cheap cost.83 “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”84 Justice Sotomayor explained that most of the trips 
one takesusing public thoroughfaresare innocent enough; 
 
see also Y. Douglas Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation of Drone 
Surveillance and the Law’s Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 343, 356–57 (2014) 
(stating the holding in Jones “expanded Fourth Amendment protections, but also 
obfuscated the Fourth Amendment standard that courts should apply”). 
 80.  See, e.g., Shane Crotty, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for Fourth 
Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 248–49 (2014) (stating the Jones opinion 
“muddied the Fourth Amendment waters” and “convoluted the issue” of Fourth 
Amendment privacy protection); Yang, supra note 79, at 357 (“As opposed to 
clarifying the standard the government should follow in surveillance procedures, 
the Jones majority’s revival of Olmstead’s physicality requirement created a split in 
the Supreme Court about whether Katz’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test 
applied exclusively in government surveillance cases, or whether Katz merely 
supplemented an Olmstead-based physical invasion approach.”). 
 81.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–52. 
 82.  See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 823–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (using the 
test laid out in Jones to analyze the NSA’s secret telephone metadata program); 
United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing the difference 
in search and seizure law before and after Jones); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 
58 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 204 (2013) (holding that a pre-Jones 
warrantless search using a GPS tracker was exempt from suppression, despite its 
unconstitutionality, based on the “good-faith” doctrine).  
 83.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 84.  See id. at 955. 
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however, there are several trips that are not.85 For example, trips to 
places such as “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion 
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal 
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the 
mosque, synagogue or church, [or] the gay bar” provide 
information that details the private lives of citizens.86 Justice 
Sotomayor feared that through the use of GPS monitoring, this 
information could conceivably be collected and stored in order to 
gain insight into the ideas and beliefs of individual citizens.87 The 
fear of being watched may chill civilian “associational and 
expressive freedoms.”88 
Consequently, under current constitutional search and seizure 
law, the government could arguably track a citizen for extended 
periods of time and record the information collected in a database, 
without ever obtaining a warrant.89 That being said, the same 
argument can be made whether the government is using a GPS 
tracker, a drone, or a team of police officers. In each case, the 
biggest restraint on the government is practicability.90 
 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)). 
 87.  Id. at 966; see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1934, 1956 (2013) (“That information gives the watcher increased power 
over the watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control 
them, even if they do not know they are being watched or persuaded.”). 
 88.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by 
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
chooses to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a 
way that is inimical to democratic society.’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 
640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))).  
 89.  See Jonathan Olivito, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone 
Surveillance Through the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 
669, 701 (2013) (“Drones can operate clandestinely over a broad area for 
extended periods of time, making them ideal surveillance tools. Operators can 
easily equip drones with high-resolution cameras, sensors, and video analysis 
programs. With current electronic storage systems, any information collected by 
drones—including photographs, videos, and sensory data—can be stored 
indefinitely for subsequent aggregation, analysis, and distribution. Whether 
government drone operators collect information intentionally or unwittingly, the 
result is equally disquieting: substantial amounts of personal information could be 
collected and stored through drone surveillance of public areas.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 90.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Justice Sotomayor also points out that GPS technology is 
comparably cheaper than other surveillance tactics, such as a 
rotating team of agents trained in advanced surveillance.91 Because 
GPS technology is cheaper, there is less of a constraint on the 
government to use such tactics.92 If a certain technology allows 
warrantless searches to occur in certain areas more frequently, then 
that technology has expanded the scope of information that the 
government can collect from its citizens.93 Justice Sotomayor 
suggests that this expansion in scope might alter society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public places.94 For example, 
one might not expect a trip to the grocery store to be private, but 
one would most likely feel that their privacy was violated if the 
government knew every single trip they took over a period of two 
months. 
Justice Alito, citing historical legal responses to advances in 
technology, observed in some cases that the best way to deal with 
developing technology that intrudes on privacy in new ways is to 
enact legislation.95 New legislation was used to handle the 
developing technology of wiretapping.96 Congress did not wish to 
leave the complex issue of wiretapping to a slowly developing 
system of common law.97 Therefore, it passed 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 
through 2522, which from that point on was the primary means 
governing wiretapping cases.98 Justice Alito stated, “A legislative 
body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”99 
 
 91.  Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id.; see also Stern & Rubekeil, supra note 29, at 8 (“Under Kyllo, the 
Fourth Amendment may protect the citizenry from warrantless searches for the 
time being, due to the relatively low usage of drones and society’s expectation that 
drones will not violate its privacy . . . . However, if the appearance of drones 
hovering in the sky becomes commonplace rather than novelty, and subsequently 
society becomes desensitized to seeing drones floating over the backyard or the 
football field, then a search by drone might cease to interfere with the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”). 
 95.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 96.  Id. at 962–63. 
 97.  Id. at 963. 
 98.  Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2013). 
 99.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Jones also brought up a topic that had not been covered by 
previous privacy law cases: whether there is a certain point in time 
where warrantless tracking of a civilian can change from 
constitutional to unconstitutional.100 That is, is there a length of 
time where perfectly legal warrantless tracking crosses over the line 
into a search which intrudes upon society’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy?101 Again, the government tracked every single movement 
of Jones’ vehicle for four weeks.102 Unfortunately, these questions 
were discussed by Justice Alito, but not answered in any meaningful 
way.103 These questions will arguably be raised in future cases of 
police drone use, but as of now, the U.S. Supreme Court has no 
clear answer. 
2. Police Aerial Surveillance 
Drones are new to the world of law enforcement, but aerial 
surveillance is not.104 Police officers have used airplanes and 
helicopters for surveillance as aircraft have become more popular 
in modern society.105 The cases involving aircraft demonstrate the 
idea that the prevalence of specific aircraft being used in society 
has an influence over the extent that police are allowed to use 
those aircraft for surveillance. 
California v. Ciraolo was the Supreme Court’s first case in which 
it had to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test to aerial 
surveillance.106 In Ciraolo, police received an anonymous tip that an 
individual was growing marijuana in his yard.107 Officers arrived at 
the house but were unable to see anything due to a fence that 
completely enclosed the yard.108 One perseverant police officer 
chartered a private plane and flew over the suspect’s house.109 In 
 
 100.  See id. (explaining the amount of time where tracking might become a 
search). 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Id. at 946 (Scalia, J., majority). 
 103.  Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 104.  Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for 
Legislators, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2 
/2014/11/drones-and-aerial-surveillance. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986). 
 107.  Id. at 209. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
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this flyover, approximately 1000 feet in the air, the officer was able 
to see marijuana plants in the yard and used this information to 
obtain a search warrant.110 
The majority in Ciraolo suggests it was of crucial importance 
that the officer was flying within public navigable airspace, as 
defined by the FAA.111 This is important because it suggests any 
individual flying in a commercial airliner or private airplane could 
peer out of an airline window and see the world below, including 
the marijuana plants at issue in Ciraolo.112 The majority opined that 
if any member of the public could look out of a plane and see into 
the yard, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
yard.113 Chief Justice Berger stated that “[i]n an age where private 
and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is 
unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants 
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the 
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”114 This assertion suggests 
that, as private drone use becomes more popular, an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy might be reduced.115 
The dissent argued that the majority’s decision moved away 
from the original intention of the Fourth Amendment—to ensure 
citizens “dwell in reasonable security and freedom from 
surveillance.”116 Justice Powell analyzed the case by considering the 
actions law enforcement would have had to take in the absence of 
technology.117 If the officer had not chartered a private plane to 
peer into the yard, he would have had to climb the fence or use a 
ladder to peer over it—which arguably would have been an 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 213. 
 112.  Id. at 213–14. 
 113.  Id. at 214. 
 114.  Id. at 215. 
 115.  See Koerner, supra note 1, at 1154 (“The government often employs new 
instruments to investigate and prosecute criminals. Likewise, criminals often 
employ new instruments to commit crimes and to evade police detection or 
capture. Ordinary citizens, however, may employ many of these same instruments 
to accommodate their everyday conveniences and necessities. According to 
Professor Orin Kerr, this complex dynamic has contributed to the numerous 
exceptions and seemingly divergent holdings of Fourth Amendment precedent.”). 
 116.  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 117.  Id. at 222. 
17
Paquette: Uncle Sam Is Watching You: A Recommendation for Minnesota Legisla
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
9. Paquette_FF4 (1296-1330) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:27 AM 
2016] POLICE DRONE USE LEGISLATION 1313 
unreasonable search.118 The dissent challenged the majority’s 
reliance on the absence of physical trespass because the manner of 
surveillance is not a relevant component of an analysis under 
Katz.119 
The holding in Ciraolo was then applied in Florida v. Riley.120 In 
Riley, the Supreme Court confronted a fact pattern very similar to 
that of Ciraolo.121 The distinguishing factor in Riley was the much 
lower altitude of 400 feet at which the police flew over the suspect’s 
property.122 The Court again pointed to the fact that public usage 
of the airspace approximately 500 feet above the ground is allowed 
under the FAA guidelines and is a common occurrence.123 Mr. Riley 
had a greenhouse in his backyard with two of its rooftop panels 
missing, thus exposing the contents of the greenhouse to any 
member of the public who might be flying above it.124 Since Mr. 
Riley had exposed this information to the public, he could not have 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his 
greenhouse.125 
Justice Brennan provided another dissent showing a significant 
amount of concern for possible privacy violations in the future.126 
Justice Brennan’s disagreement with the majority can be summed 
up succinctly in his own words, “I cannot agree that one ‘knowingly 
exposes [an area] to the public’ solely because a helicopter may 
legally fly above it.”127 The dissent pointed out that the majority’s 
holding would seem to allow any police invasion of privacy as long 
as a “single member of the public could conceivably position 
herself to see into the area in question without doing anything 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 223 (“Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to 
the standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by 
focusing on the interests of the individual and of a free society.”). 
 120.  488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989). 
 121.  Compare Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (involving police surveillance in a fixed 
wing aircraft of a suspect’s curtilage), with Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) 
(involving police surveillance in a helicopter of a suspect’s curtilage). 
 122.  Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. 
 123.  Id. at 450. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 450–51. 
 126.  See id. at 456–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I find considerable cause for 
concern in the fact that a plurality of four justices would remove virtually all 
constitutional barriers to police surveillance from the vantage point of 
helicopters.”). 
 127.  Id. at 457. 
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illegal.”128 Thus, the majority’s analysis moved away from the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and into a test of whether it 
was possible for the public to see the illegal behavior in question.129 
The holding in Riley is crucial for analyzing drone cases 
because the judgement of the Court seems to suggest if a police 
aerial vehicle—such as a drone—is in an area in which the public 
could conceivably and legally be, then it is not a search, no matter 
what the aerial vehicle happens to see.130 The recently released FAA 
guidelines for unmanned aerial systems sets the acceptable drone 
elevation at up to 500 feet.131 The Court’s expansive view on aerial 
surveillance has been dialed back slightly with subsequent case law; 
however, based on this holding, it would appear that the 
Constitution would allow for police drones, flying 500 feet above 
the ground, to observe and record anything and everything below 
without being considered a search. Justice Brennan provided a 
strikingly appropriate hypothetical of a futuristic version of a 
helicopter that can hover just above an enclosed courtyard or a 
patio: “Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to 
discover not only what crops people were growing in their 
greenhouses, but also what books they were reading and who their 
dinner guests were.”132 Justice Brennan predicted the fears society 
has today regarding drone use; however, under the majority’s 
understanding of privacy and search law, such use of a drone would 
not be considered a search and would therefore not require a 
warrant.133 
Kyllo and Riley both considered how common the vehicle with 
which the police conducted their surveillance was in everyday life.134 
In this day and age, drones are not as commonplace as planes or 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 460. 
 130.  Sheehan, supra note 49, at 280 (“This is especially problematic because 
the current COAs allow public UAVs to fly under this [500 foot] limit while still 
complying with the regulations in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act.”). 
 131.  Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Propose New Rules 
for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news 
/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295; see Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news 
/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=18297 (describing the FAA’s incremental 
approach to safe UAS integration into the nation’s airspace). 
 132.  Riley, 488 U.S. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 133.  See id. at 450 (majority opinion). 
 134.  Id. at 458; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
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helicopters, which means that their use for surveillance purposes 
could be more likely to constitute a search based on society’s 
objective reasonable expectation of privacy from drones.135 Some 
scholars predict that this could change over time: “[I]f the 
appearance of drones hovering in the sky becomes commonplace 
rather than novelty, and subsequently society becomes desensitized 
to seeing drones floating over the backyard or the football field, 
then a search by drone might cease to interfere with the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”136 
The Court has only slightly scaled back its view on aerial 
surveillance. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the EPA hired a 
professional photographer to fly above the business complex of 
Dow Chemical Company and take pictures of the 2000 acres of 
land.137 The Court maintained its prior reasoning and ruled that 
this was not a search.138 However, it expressly stated that if the 
photographer had been using some type of advanced technology 
that could “pierce” the walls of the complex and either see or hear 
into the buildings, there would likely be a search.139 Justice Powell 
was greatly concerned by the Court’s decision to base whether a 
search had occurred upon the manner of technology used.140 As 
Justice Brennan opined, “Such an inquiry will not protect Fourth 
Amendment rights, but rather will permit their gradual decay as 
technology advances.”141 This explanation focuses on the fact that 
as technology advances, the law will simply fall behind. The holding 
in Dow Chemical likely limits the extent to which drones can use 
features such as enhanced microphones, thermal imaging, and 
other tools that would “pierce” the walls of a private home or 
business.142 
Applying Supreme Court case law up to this point in time 
suggests that police will arguably have very few limitations on drone 
use. Police cannot use drones in a way that physically trespasses on 
 
 135.  Stern & Rubekeil, supra note 29, at 8. 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986). 
 138.  Id. at 239. 
 139.  Id. at 238. 
 140.  Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  See Taly Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The 
Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 296 (2015). 
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one’s home.143 Police cannot use advanced technology that would 
allow them to see or hear anything inside of one’s home.144 
However, case law shows that police can conduct aerial surveillance 
if they are at an altitude approved by the FAA.145 Moreover, it is not 
clear how long a drone can continuously survey an individual 
before requiring a warrant. One could argue that it would be 
constitutional for the police, without a warrant, to use a drone to 
survey an individual anytime he or she entered a public 
thoroughfare or to investigate the curtilage of a suspect’s home.146 
This patchwork assortment of law is particularly concerning in the 
drone context because drones can simply be manufactured or 
adjusted in ways that make them more invasive, but still within the 
minimal boundaries set forth by the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.147 
IV. THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION AND DRONE LEGISLATION 
The U.S. Constitution does not limit the protection provided 
by state constitutions to the citizens of that state.148 This system of 
judicial federalism mandates only that the state constitution 
provide at least what the U.S. Constitution requires.149 Minnesota is 
 
 143.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012). 
 144.  See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237–38. 
 145.  Sheehan, supra note 49, at 281 (“Due to the overwhelming amount of 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Katz test and the lack of information 
provided by the FAA, any case involving UAV warrantless surveillance which 
complies with the established FAA regulations would most likely be upheld by the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 146.  Andrea Lance, Back to the Future of Your Privacy Rights: U.S. v. Jones, 95 
MASS. L. REV. 214, 216 (2013) (mentioning the lack of authority regarding long-
term surveillance). 
 147.  Koerner, supra note 1, at 1154 (“The government can navigate the 
various doctrinal loopholes by altering the designs and capabilities of drones, the 
location and flight paths of drones, the means of acquiring information, and the 
types of information acquired. In effect, drones implicate the most factually 
diverse aspects of an already diverse and unpredictable jurisprudence.”). 
 148.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see also Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980). But see Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights 
guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ . . . the same 
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.” 
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))).  
 149.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
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among the majority of states that generally adheres to the principle 
of uniformity.150 In adherence with this general principle, 
Minnesota has yet to adopt a stance on aerial surveillance that 
provides more protection than that of the U.S. Constitution.151 
Since Minnesota courts remain in uniformity with the U.S. 
Constitution in terms of privacy rights and aerial surveillance, the 
same questions involving police drone use remain unanswered. As 
Justice Alito pointed out in Jones, when the courts remain silent on 
an issue, it can be useful to turn to the legislature.152 Unfortunately, 
the Minnesota legislature also remains silent on the issue. In 2013 
and early 2014, two Minnesota Senate bills and one Minnesota 
House bill were introduced and sent to committee.153 These bills 
died in committee due to an inability to garner the support needed 
to become law.154 
These three bills represent two different theories of drone 
legislation. Both HF 1994155 and SF 2037156 proposed a blanket 
warrant requirement over all drone use, with a few exceptions: if 
the drone is used to counter a high risk of a terrorist attack, if 
police receive a warrant to use the drone, if the drone would be 
used to prevent imminent danger to life or to catch a fleeing 
suspect, and if the drone was needed to prevent the loss of life or 
property in natural or manmade disasters.157 
 
 150.  Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Energy 
& Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 351–52 (Minn. 1984) (holding that 
Minnesota seeks uniformity between state and federal policies to reduce 
unnecessary confusion). 
 151.  See State v. Anderson, 414 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“The 
fly-over inspections (and aerial photography), if conducted in the public airspace, 
were also not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (citing California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986))); see also State v. Nolan, 356 N.W.2d 670, 670–71 
(Minn. 1984) (holding a search warrant was not required for the sheriff to search 
defendant’s property because the Fourth Amendment does not protect open 
fields). 
 152.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 153.  See H.R. Res. 612, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013); S. Res. 485, 88th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013). 
 154.  See Dan Gunderson, Drone Bills Appear Grounded This Year in Minnesota 
Legislature, MPR NEWS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/04 
/01/politics/drone-legislation-minnesota. 
 155.  Minn. H.R. Res. 612. 
 156.  Minn. S. Res. 485. 
 157.  See id.; Minn. H.R. Res. 612. 
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The other Minnesota bill, SF 2687, is different in that it laid 
out a very specific and detailed system for law enforcement’s use of 
drones.158 It also proposed a prohibition on the police drone use 
without a warrant, making an exception for emergencies that 
involve an imminent threat to persons or property.159 However, the 
bill also required police drone use to comply with all FAA 
guidelines, have a clearly and narrowly defined target, not use 
facial recognition or other biometric technology without a court 
order, not be equipped with weapons, only retain limited data, and 
be accompanied by after-the-fact notice to the targets of drone 
surveillance.160 The bill goes even further, requiring all law 
enforcement agencies to occasionally report drone use statistics to 
the legislature and on their public websites.161 Additionally, the bill 
proposed any judge approving or denying drone surveillance 
warrants must report those statistics annually to the State Court 
Administrator.162 
As mentioned above, none of these three bills made it through 
committee, and therefore the legislature did not vote on these bills. 
This likely reflects the fact that domestic drone technology was a 
very new and emerging technology in 2013. At the time that these 
bills were in committee, the FAA was developing new rules for the 
use of drones in American airspace.163 Legislators arguably did not 
want to set any hard and fast rules until they knew what kind of 
boundaries the FAA was going to set.164 Other legislators, such as 
Representative John Lesch, felt that this was a missed opportunity 
for “foot-in-the-door legislation.”165 Representative Lesch expressed 
his concern that this delay in legislation would allow companies 
that manufacture and distribute drones to lobby against privacy 
rights: “And then there is the inevitability that when another year 
passes more and more agencies will decide, ‘Hey, I want to use 
these drones,’ and then any privacy legislation gets bogged down in 
a myriad of interested parties . . . .”166 These interested parties are 
 
 158.  See Minn. S. Res. 485. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See Gunderson, supra note 154. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
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certainly active and lobbying to protect their interests;167 however, 
this issue is inherently going to bring privacy rights enthusiasts and 
law enforcement agencies into direct competition. 
V. EXISTING DRONE LEGISLATION 
A. Other State Legislation 
Minnesota is not the only state that has thus far failed to 
provide guidelines on the use of drones by law enforcement. In 
2013 alone, “forty-three states introduced 130 drone-related 
legislative proposals.”168 Despite the high number of states 
introducing proposals, by April 2014, less than one-third of all 
states passed legislation restricting and/or regulating domestic 
drone use.169 Those states that passed drone-use legislation are 
prime examples of the variations of drone regulation. 
Florida’s Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, 
originally passed in 2013, represents the more “standard” type of 
current anti-drone legislation.170 The Act provides a blanket warrant 
requirement for any police use of drones, but also lays out a few 
specific exceptions to the general rule.171 The exceptions include 
situations involving a high risk of terrorist attack and situations 
when police have reasonable suspicion that drones are needed to 
 
 167.  See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 49, at 276 (“While much pressure on the 
FAA was exerted by lobbying groups such as the Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
attempted to counter this pressure by filing a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) in 2009 for disclosures and further information on the 
use of UAVs both in foreign nations and domestically.”). 
 168.  Yang, supra note 79, at 367 (citing 2013 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org 
/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/unmanned-aerial-vehicles.aspx). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. 
and Spec. A Sess. of the Twenty-Fourth Leg.); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.335 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (imposing a blanket warrant requirement 
for the use of drones, but also including various exceptions to the general rule). 
 171.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (Westlaw); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
167/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 of 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 29-29.4-01 to -06 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-609 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 423.002 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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prevent imminent loss of life or property, escape of suspects, or 
destruction of evidence.172 
A style of legislation distinct from the blanket warrant 
requirement in Florida is Idaho’s restriction on the use of 
unmanned aircraft systems.173 That statute categorizes law 
enforcement’s use of drones based on whether the drones target 
private property or public property.174 Police drones targeting 
public property are subject to virtually no legislative restrictions.175 
Law enforcement agencies’ only restraint on public property 
targets is that they cannot photograph or record an individual, 
without his or her consent, for the purpose of publically 
disseminating that information.176 When police drones target 
private property, they can only be used without a warrant if the 
private owner consents or if the use is an “emergency response for 
safety, search and rescue or controlled substance investigations.”177 
This categorization of targeting private versus public property 
reflects the constitutional case law that has developed to limit 
privacy rights in public areas. 
Other states use more amorphous statutory language 
indicating that their legislatures intend to follow the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. For example, 
Wisconsin’s Act 213 states that warrantless drone surveillance 
cannot be used in a criminal investigation “to gather evidence or 
other information from or at a place or location where an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”178 The Act also 
expressly states that its privacy protection does not extend to public 
places.179 Similarly, Montana’s drone regulation statute excludes 
the use of any evidence gathered by a drone unless the police 
obtained a warrant for the drone or a judicially recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement was present.180 This kind of 
 
 172.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50, subdiv. 4 (Westlaw). 
 173.  Compare id. § 934.50 (Westlaw), with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.). 
 174.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (Westlaw). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55, subdiv. 2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 
127). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-109, subdiv. 1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.). 
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statutory language allows restrictions on police drone use to shift 
and adapt alongside the Supreme Court’s developing case law. 
Some states provide bright-line rules meant to combat specific 
concerns about drone technology. For example, Oregon’s drone 
restriction statute states that any time drone surveillance is 
conducted, with or without a warrant, the period of continuous 
surveillance cannot exceed thirty days.181 Tennessee’s Freedom 
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act specifically states that “[t]he 
use of a drone to gather evidence or information shall constitute a 
search.”182 
In 2013, Virginia went to the extreme length of imposing a 
two-year moratorium on all police drone use except in cases of 
Amber Alerts, Senior Alerts, Blue Alerts, search and rescue 
missions, and “training exercises related to such uses.”183 That 
moratorium expired on July 1, 2015, and was immediately replaced 
by a statute requiring a warrant for any police drone use other than 
the exceptions mentioned in the moratorium.184 
VI. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION 
Current application of constitutional law to police use of 
drones provides more questions than answers. The gaps in privacy 
protection need to be quickly filled by appropriate legislation and 
not gradually covered up by the reactive application of judicial 
interpretation.185 The key question thus becomes: what is 
appropriate legislation? Appropriate legislation provides for the 
vital balance between individual privacy rights and public safety. 
The law does not need to ban drone use because society fears the 
capabilities of drones. However, legislation must be narrowly 
 
 181.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.320 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
But see Yang, supra note 79, at 379 (explaining the loophole in time limits that 
could allow police to use a drone for the length of the limit, land the drone at 
police headquarters for a minimal period of time, and then resume surveillance). 
 182.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609, subdiv. g(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
1st Reg. Sess.). 
 183.  H.R. 2012, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013). 
 184.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 
2016 Reg. Sess. c. 1). 
 185.  Cf., e.g., O’Brien, supra note 45, at 222 (“Legislation that clearly defines 
whether or not a warrant is needed for a drone search of a vehicle aids law 
enforcement and puts the public on notice of its rights.”). 
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tailored to ensure that drones cannot be used in the ways that we 
fear. 
Polls taken over the last several years make it clear that U.S. 
citizens are, at the very least, wary about domestic use of drones by 
police agencies.186 A 2012 poll found that only thirty percent of 
voters favored the use of drones for domestic surveillance.187 
Another report, released in 2013, found that “[Forty-nine percent] 
of Americans would be very concerned and [twenty percent] would 
be somewhat concerned about their own privacy if U.S. law 
enforcement started using unmanned drones with high tech 
surveillance cameras and recording equipment.”188 
Public concern alone is not enough to justify an outright ban 
on a promising new tool for police.189 Many states have responded 
to public concern by drafting and enacting legislation that 
effectively bans the use of drones for surveillance without a warrant 
or absent a high-risk situation.190 These statutes provide exceptions 
for various scenarios that are likely to occur very rarely.191 Statutes 
 
 186.  Matiteyahu, supra note 142, at 282 (citing Voters Are Gung-Ho for Use of 
Drones But Not over the United States, RASMUSSEN REP. (Feb. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/afghanistan
/voters_are_gung_ho_for_use_of_drones_but_not_over_the_united_states). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  MONMOUTH UNIV. POLL, NATIONAL: U.S. SUPPORTS UNARMED DOMESTIC 




 189.  See Yang, supra note 79, at 374 (“Society should not simply hamstring 
drone use because of its ‘fear that rapidly advancing science and technology is 
making [surveillance] more and more effective.’ Rather, there should [be a] 
balance []between legitimate government needs and society’s privacy interest.” 
(quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting))). 
 190.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st 
Reg. Sess. and Spec. A Sess.); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.335 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (limiting law enforcement use of drones to search and 
rescue activities, emergencies affecting individuals, and a declared state of 
emergency). 
 191.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
1st Reg. Sess.) (allowing the unwarranted use of drones “[t]o counter a high risk 
of a terrorist attack”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1(C)(i) (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016 Reg. Sess. c. 1) (allowing the unwarranted use of drones 
for Amber Alerts).  
27
Paquette: Uncle Sam Is Watching You: A Recommendation for Minnesota Legisla
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
9. Paquette_FF4 (1296-1330) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:27 AM 
2016] POLICE DRONE USE LEGISLATION 1323 
drafted in such a way provide unnecessarily extreme restrictions on 
police agencies.192 
On the other hand, not restricting law enforcement’s use of 
drones whatsoever could be viewed as a failure of the legislature’s 
obligation to represent the citizens who elected them. Therefore, 
some sort of legislation is arguably necessary. 
Some technology, by its very nature, revolutionizes police 
practices.193 There are scholars who believe that when this happens, 
the law adapts to the new technology by restoring police power to 
what it was before the technological advancement.194 In doing so, 
the balance between privacy rights and public safety is 
maintained.195 Of course, it would be advantageous for the law to 
preemptively adapt to the new technology before that technology is 
used to the detriment of society.196 
Legislation needs to preemptively and specifically attack the 
uses of drones that clearly violate the public’s sense of privacy (not 
necessarily under the Katz analysis) but that are not clearly 
 
 192.  See Yang, supra note 79, at 388 (“[T]he Court simply has not addressed 
the limits of drone use as of yet, and the legislatures have misapplied warrant 
requirements to drones when such requirements are too broad, too blunt, and 
unreasonably restrictive.”). 
 193.  Cf. Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches 
to Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2014) (“Professor Paul 
Ohm observes that, given how rapidly technology is changing our everyday lives 
and our notions about what is considered ‘private,’ a more appropriate way to 
understand the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is as a restraint on police 
power.” (citing Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1336–38 (2012))). 
 194.  Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 485 (2011) (“The law intentionally limits the scope of 
police power to limit the government’s capacity for abusive practices. It allows 
particularly invasive government practices only in limited circumstances when 
investigators have specific reasons to link the person or place to the crime in a way 
that justifies the intrusion.”).  
 195.  See id. at 487–88 (“Equilibrium-adjustment acts as a correction 
mechanism. . . . [W]hen judges perceive that changing technology or social 
practice significantly enhances government power, courts embrace higher 
protections to counter the expansion of government power.”). 
 196.  See Richard W. Tast, Comment, Unmanned Aerial Systems: Domestic Statutory 
Issues, 93 NEB. L. REV. 773, 802 (2015) (“Domestic use of [unmanned aerial 
systems] has many potential benefits, so it is important for the laws regarding their 
use to address negative ramifications in advance of implementation. Addressing 
these issues in advance will ensure their public acceptance, allowing the positive 
benefits to be fully realized.”). 
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unconstitutional.197 Some categories of uses include: (1) duration 
of drone surveillance; (2) drone proximity; (3) sense-enhancing 
technology; (4) data retention; (5) dragnet versus targeted 
surveillance; and (6) weaponization.198 
A. Duration of Drone Surveillance 
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Jones, introduced the 
idea that the duration of surveillance may have an effect on the 
constitutionality of a search.199 This question was not resolved, but 
the public would arguably be uncomfortable with the idea of 
constant surveillance spanning an unlimited amount of time.200 
Long-term surveillance is dangerous because it “reveals patterns, 
habits, and preferences of an individual’s life in a way that other 
forms of surveillance do not.”201 A traditional police stakeout could 
gather similar information, but drones can do so for significantly 
less in operational costs.202 
Therefore, legislation should limit the maximum duration of 
warrantless drone surveillance to something similar to twenty-four 
hours in a seventy-two-hour window.203 It is important to draft the 
legislation with a window of time that closes the loophole situation 
where the police may use a drone for twenty-three hours, 
momentarily land the drone back at headquarters, and then send it 
back to resume surveillance.204 
 
 197.  Cf. Yang, supra note 79, at 388 (“[C]ourts and legislatures should look to 
bright-line rules that are more precise, attuned, and reasonable, while affording a 
similar level of protection that an ordinary person enjoys today.”). 
 198.  See id. at 375–76. 
 199.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the car for 
even a brief time, under the [majority’s] theory, the Fourth Amendment applies. 
But if the police follow the same car for a much longer period using unmarked 
cars and aerial assistance, this tracking is not subject to any Fourth Amendment 
constraints.”).  
 200.  See Farber, supra note 193, at 40 (“The concern regards the duration of 
the monitoring—the greater the duration, the more intrusive the invasion and the 
greater the amount of information the government can gather.”). 
 201.  Victoria T. San Pedro, Student Work, Drone Legislation: Keeping an Eye on 
Law Enforcement’s Latest Surveillance Technology, 43 STETSON L. REV. 679, 715 (2014). 
 202.  See id at 714–15.  
 203.  Yang, supra note 79, at 379. 
 204.  Id.  
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B. Drone Proximity 
Another “fuzzy” area of constitutional surveillance law deals 
with the places that drones can conduct surveillance. Using 
legislation to limit drone proximity to homes and possibly the 
curtilage would allow a clear consensus that the police cannot fly a 
drone in your backyard. However, the legislation must strike a 
balance between the inherent privacy interest in one’s backyard 
and the need of law enforcement to protect the public safety.205 
Laws such as those enacted by Idaho—which effectively ban any 
warrantless use of drones over private property—are far too 
broad.206 Private areas, for purposes of Idaho’s law, include 
farmland and open fields, making it virtually impossible for police 
to fly drones at all.207 
Appropriate legislation would consider the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy test,” the Jones trespass analysis, and the FAA 
guidelines for drones.208 This type of legislation would outlaw the 
use of drones unreasonably close to private property, in violation of 
the applicable FAA guidelines, or in a way that presents a nuisance 
to the private property.209 This would clarify and reinforce the 
constitutional case law that has developed to this point. It would 
also balance the right of privacy and the need for public safety by 
allowing police to conduct demonstrably necessary surveillance 
without violating the Constitution.210 
C. Sense-Enhancing Technology 
One of the areas that presents the most potential for abuse is 
the use of sense-enhancing technology in drones. Drones are 
capable of using thermal imaging technology, license plate reading 
technology, and many other functions.211 Under Kyllo, it is 
 
 205.  See id. at 379–80. 
 206.  See id. at 380.  
 207.  See id.  
 208.  See id. at 381–82. 
 209.  See id.  
 210.  See O’Brien, supra note 45, at 223 (“[B]roadly prohibiting all warrantless 
use of governmental drones is unnecessary and fails to adequately balance the 
needs of privacy protection and law enforcement.”). 
 211.  See id. at 217 (“A drone is augmenting the senses by providing long-term 
surveillance with video, detailed images, and tracking technology that exceeds 
human capabilities.” (citing Government Applications, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC., 
http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x4/applications 
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considered a search for police to use sense-enhancing technology 
that is not available to the public in order to view the interior of a 
person’s home.212 However, due to the nature of drones and the 
ever-increasing prevalence of sense-enhancing technology to the 
public, the Kyllo holding is not enough to protect privacy rights 
from drones.213 Any drone legislation should prohibit the 
warrantless use of any sense-enhancing technology used to view the 
inside of a constitutionally protected area whether or not that 
technology is available to the public.214 This would preemptively 
answer the question of how the law will react if drones equipped 
with thermal imaging cameras or other technology become 
available to the general public. 
 
/government.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2015))); Justin Lee, Public Drones Equipped 
with Facial Recognition Software Raise Privacy Concerns, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (May 7, 
2015), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201505/public-drones-equipped-with     
-facial-recognition-software-raise-privacy-concerns. 
 212.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area . . . constitutes a search—at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.” (citation omitted)).  
 213.  See Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones 
Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. 
POL’Y 1, 16 (2013) (“As these technologies are not necessarily in general public 
use, law enforcement’s use of them would likely trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections under Kyllo. However, because the general public can actually 
purchase the technology relatively easily, drone technology may be considered 
more pervasive then originally believed.”); see also XIRO Xplorer Aerial UAV Drone 
Quadcopter, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/XIRO-Xplorer-Aerial                
-Quadcopter-Version/dp/B01233S0TO/ref=sr_1_5?s=toys-and-games&ie=UTF8 
&qid=1447256983&sr=1-5&keywords=drone&refinements=p_36%3A50000              
-99999999 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (illustrating the example of a remote-
controlled drone which can be purchased online by anyone for $639.00. The 
drone shoots full HD video at 1080p/30fps and 720p/30fps, has several 
photography modes, and has built in functions allowing the drone to 
autonomously follow or circle around the pilot). 
 214.  See Yang, supra note 79, at 384 (“As it pertains to private property, [this 
Rule] restricts the government to ‘see[ing] what may be seen from a public 
vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’” (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 
445, 449 (1989))). 
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D. Data Retention 
An important question involving the use of drones is: what 
happens to the data that is collected by drones after they complete 
their surveillance? Any aerial surveillance is likely to capture a 
variety of individuals participating in legal and possibly illegal 
behavior. What happens if a lawfully utilized drone is conducting 
surveillance on a target of investigation and inadvertently captures 
the day-to-day life of a neighbor of the target? Does the 
government get to keep that data and store it away in case they 
need information on the neighbor in the future? Drone legislation 
in this area should mirror the Illinois statute that imposes a thirty-
day retention limit on any information collected by a drone, unless 
it is needed for criminal prosecution.215 Any violation of this rule 
should result in the exclusion of that evidence.216 
E. Dragnet Versus Targeted Surveillance 
Dragnet surveillance is an issue that absolutely must be 
addressed in drone legislation because the National Security 
Agency has recently taken part in warrantless, dragnet 
surveillance/collection of private phone data.217 “Massive, 
unabridged and unfiltered information gathering presents a 
significant threat to privacy.”218 State legislation should be used to 
expressly prohibit the practice of massive surveillance and dragnet 
data collection. All drone use, including drone use without a 
warrant, must be limited to a specific and identifiable target.219 
 
 215.  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167/20 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 of 
the 2015 Reg. Sess.); see also Allie Bohm, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of State 
Legislation Passed This Year, ACLU (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://www.aclu.org 
/blog/year-drone-analysis-state-legislation-passed-year. 
 216.  See Yang, supra note 79, at 387. 
 217.  See Jonathan Weisman, Momentum Builds Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics 
/momentum-builds-against-nsa-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all (describing the 
NSA’s telephone data collection program and the massive public outcry against 
it). 
 218.  Yang, supra note 79, at 386.  
 219.  See San Pedro, supra note 201, at 719 (citing Zachary Fagenson, Florida 
Keys Considering Drones to Help Eradicate Mosquitoes, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 17, 2013), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1954207.html), (“With the 
ubiquity of drone licenses among American law enforcement agencies, the drag-
net surveillance that was once a laughable concept is now a reality.”). 
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Drafting legislation in such a way prohibits the use of the Gorgon 
Stare or other wide-angle drone camera technology that could 
effectively surveil an entire city. 
F. Weaponization 
Domestic drone weaponization is another hot-button issue that 
needs to be addressed with legislation.220 Most Americans are 
familiar with the use of drones in foreign wars and understand the 
power that these tools possess. Obviously, any legislation should 
disallow the use of predator-style drones equipped with missiles to 
roam the national airspace, surveil, or target U.S. citizens.221 
However, drones are capable of more discrete weaponization. For 
example, in Lucknow, India the local police purchased four drones 
and equipped them with pepper spray, which the drones will use 
for crowd control on angry or unruly crowds.222 Closer to home, 
North Dakota has enacted legislation that allows drones to be 
equipped with non-lethal weapons.223 
Domestic drone weaponization is unnecessary and presents a 
litany of dangers, which would be best to avoid. Legislation passed 
by Oregon,224 Utah,225 Virginia,226 and Wisconsin227 all expressly 
prohibit any type of weaponization of domestic drones. Domestic 
drones should be left to the use of surveillance. Therefore, any 
legislation should expressly prohibit equipping drones with lethal 
or non-lethal weapons.228 
 
 220.  See Brinkerhoff, supra note 43. 
 221.  See MQ-1B Predator Drone Fact Sheet, U.S.A.F. (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq  
-1b-predator.aspx (describing the technical aspects of the MQ-1B Predator drone). 
 222.  Monica Sarkar, Security From the Sky: Indian City to Use Pepper-Spray Drones 
for Crowd Control, CNN (last updated Apr. 9, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2015/04/09/asia/india-police-drones. 
 223.  See Brinkerhoff, supra note 43. 
 224.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.365 (West, Westlaw through 2015). 
 225.  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-18-101 to 63G-18-105 (West, Westlaw through 
2015) (restricting government use of data collected by drones).  
 226.  2013 Va. Acts 755 § 1 (prohibiting weaponization of domestic drones 
before July 1, 2005). 
 227.  S.B. 196, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013). 
 228.  Eric Brumfield, Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why It Might Be Time to 
Re-Examine the Current Use of Force Standard, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543, 555 (2014) 
(citing Chris Calabrese & Jay Stanley, Ban on Arming Domestic Drones: Let’s Draw a 
Line in the Sand, ACLU (June 15, 2012, 7:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether society likes it or not, drone technology is expanding 
at a rapid rate. Law enforcement agencies are noticing the 
potential benefits that such technology could have in their 
operations. However, this new technology does not translate well 
into the current constitutional case law regarding tracking and 
aerial surveillance. Therefore, there is a massive amount of room 
for abuse. The potential for violations of American citizens’ privacy 
rights is unsettling. 
The Minnesota Constitution does not clear up the potential 
issues raised under federal constitutional law, and Minnesota 
legislation has yet to enact a law that would regulate drone 
technology abuse. Other states have approached the issue in their 
own ways. Reviewing these other state statutes and weighing their 
strengths and weaknesses allows future legislation to build and 
improve upon the initial laws. 
Many of these initial state statutes lean towards the prohibition 
of police drone use instead of drone regulation. These statutes only 
allow drones to be used in certain exigent circumstances as defined 
in their respective statutes. While doing so, the said statutes ignore 
the benefits to society that drones can offer. 
The FBI’s National Crime Information Center reports that 
there were 635,155 missing person reports in 2014 alone.229 Drones 
are particularly well suited to search areas for individuals and to 
surveil designated locations. In cases where time is of the essence, 
does society really want to bog down deployment of potentially life-
saving technology with specific, cumbersome warrant procedures 
and protocols? Does society want to limit the use of drones only to 
situations where probable cause exists even if similar, but less 
effective, forms of surveillance could be conducted without a 
warrant?230 
 
/technology-and-liberty-free-speech-nationalsecurity/ban-arming-domestic             
-drones) (“The ACLU believes it will be easier for a LEA to use force against the 
public, and therefore ‘force will be used more . . . [and armed d]rones may also be 
more likely to result in harm to innocent bystanders.’”). 
 229.  NCIC Missing Person and Unidentified Person Statistics for 2014, FBI, https:// 
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/ncic-missing-person-and-unidentified-person         
-statistics-for-2014 (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 230.  See Yang, supra note 79, at 374 (“Here, the inexact application of a broad 
restriction inevitably leads to an odd and unreasonable result: under a blanket 
warrant requirement scheme drones would be unable to perform, without a 
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The appropriate legislation for domestic law enforcement use 
of drones is to enact bright-line rules restricting the use of drones 
in ways that violate society’s general notions of privacy. These 
bright-line rules should, at least, regulate: (1) the duration of 
drone surveillance; (2) drone proximity; (3) sense-enhancing 
technology; (4) data retention; (5) dragnet versus targeted 
surveillance; and (6) weaponization.231 
Drone technology will continue to advance. The police will 
continue to utilize this technology. Therefore, the privacy rights of 
U.S. citizens are dependent upon the preemptive passage of 
legislation that lays out a vision of how police drones will be used in 
the future. Without such legislation, we will continue to stumble 
blindly through the unknown. The suggestions made herein would 
provide a guiding light for law enforcement agencies to follow so 
that they may fulfill their legitimate duty to protect the public while 
maintaining society’s fundamental values. 
 
warrant, some of the same surveillance tasks from the same locations that 
helicopters and airplanes have been authorized to execute without warrants for 
decades.”). 
 231.  See id. at 388 (“Instead of applying a near-universal warrant requirement, 
courts and legislatures should look to bright-line rules that are more precise, 
attuned, and reasonable, while affording a similar level of protection that an 
ordinary person enjoys today.”). 
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